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1. Introduction 
Few public diplomacy researchers have contextualized 
their studies within rigorous theoretical frameworks 
(Entman, 2008), and most of the research has largely 
focused on governments as the sole agents of public 
diplomacy (Gilboa, 2008). With few exceptions, schol-
ars have mainly examined US public diplomacy efforts, 
excluded non-state actors from the discussions, and ig-
nored communication theories and models, such as 
framing and branding, which can help explain public 
diplomacy strategies (Gilboa, 2008). However, thanks 
largely to the ubiquity of formerly inaccessible public 
diplomacy communication tools—particularly digital, 
mobile and social media—mounting evidence points to 
non-state political actors using public diplomacy meth-
ods and sophisticated communication strategies to 
achieve their goals of targeting foreign publics. This is 
especially true for what Seib (2011) refers to as “virtual 
states” that aspire to establish real states. A case in 
point is the group known as the Islamic State in Iraq 
and Syria (ISIS).  
ISIS’s terrorism and communication strategies have 
lately seized the attention of analysts and researchers, 
particularly western scholars and journalists who are 
startled by the group’s ability to globally recruit thou-
sands of Muslim women and men from western states, 
as well as some recent converts to Islam (Hagopian, 
2015; Franz, 2015; Neumann, 2015; Schmitt & 
Sengupta, 2015; Vidino, 2014). International news me-
dia routinely report on “ISIS’s ‘slick’ propaganda appa-
ratus, western recruits becoming radicalized through 
social media, and the U.S. government's sluggishness—
or outright ineptitude—in fighting back on the Inter-
net” (Gilsinan, 2015). Long multimedia feature stories 
with catchy headlines, such as “Jihad and Girl Power: 
How ISIS Lured 3 London Girls,” (Bennhold, 2015) have 
become commonplace in the daily news digest. Even 
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western intelligence organizations are worried about 
ISIS’s “extraordinary command of seemingly less lethal 
weapons: cutting-edge videos, videos shot from drones 
and multilingual Twitter messages” (The Straits Times, 
2014). According to Gartensteing-Ross (2015), key to 
ISIS’s success is its “production of tightly choreo-
graphed and slickly produced videos…, its apparently 
deep understanding of how to catch the Western me-
dia’s attention, and [its] exceptionally skilled coordi-
nated distribution of its content on platforms like Twit-
ter” (p. 2). The consensus seems to be that ISIS is 
“winning its propaganda war against the United States 
and other Western powers” (Gartenstein-Ross, 2015). 
However, many of these reports may have missed 
the point and inadvertently served ISIS’s goals of cap-
turing international media attention to further 
strengthen its brand and reach more recruits. Moreo-
ver, the focused attention on ISIS’s terrorism and bru-
tality has helped it gain further ground, a characteristic 
dilemma of covering terrorism acts that highlights the 
symbiotic relationship between media and terrorism 
(Viera, 1991; Wilkinson, 1997). Terrorism, unlike other 
war strategies and criminal acts, is primarily a “means 
to win media attention and news coverage” (Nacos, 
2002), especially by fledgling non-state actors with lim-
ited access to dominant or legacy mass media and des-
perate for publicity, recognition and legitimacy. At the 
same time, terrorism, as a combat strategy, is essen-
tially a psychological warfare tactic (Ganor, 2004; 
Schmid, 2005). While ISIS has been using terrorism 
simultaneously as a psychological warfare method and 
as part of its innovative public diplomacy mechanism—
the latter being the focus of this study—it is difficult to 
analytically separate the two when it comes ISIS’s 
overall public diplomacy objectives, especially the re-
cruitment of supporters. In fact, ISIS’s brutal terrorism 
images ensure spectacular international media cover-
age while simultaneously carrying threatening messag-
es that aim to deter its enemies. Meanwhile, ISIS also 
disseminates messages of recruitment, justification and 
calls for action. For example, less than 24 hours after ISIS 
attacked Paris on November 13, 2015, an ISIS-produced 
recruitment video (released originally in November 
2014) resurfaced and circulated widely online. The video 
featured three French citizens burning their passports 
and calling on French Muslims to join the fight in Syr-
ia/Iraq or conduct attacks inside France (Bora, 2014). 
ISIS’s extremely violent spectacles are also often em-
bedded with recruitment messages specifically targeting 
nationals attracted by the terrorism act. For instance, 
videos of ISIS’s mass beheadings disproportionately em-
phasize the diversity of the executioners, “ensuring that 
the foreign fighters [are] clearly visible and sparking a 
rush [by the media] to identify them” (Stern & Berger, 
2015, p. 76). This indicates that, through these behead-
ings, ISIS primarily aims to recruit foreign supporters, 
even as it strengthens its ominous and terrifying image.  
To be sure, public beheadings have been used by 
many groups in the past (Stern & Berger, 2015, p. 2), 
but ISIS has raised this heinous act to a new level by in-
tegrating it within its propaganda machine, dramatizing 
it with cutting edge production and storytelling tech-
niques, disseminating it widely using social and mass 
media, and aligning it effectively with its brand to serve 
its public diplomacy goals of converting and recruiting 
foreign supporters—all while simultaneously using it as a 
psychological warfare tactic to deter enemies. Through 
this strategy, ISIS has not only taken advantage of the 
global reach of social media, but has also forced mass 
media frames that serve its narrative and goals.  
For example, when ISIS executed a captured Jorda-
nian Air Force pilot by burning him alive, international 
news, especially pan-Arab satellite news, widely broad-
casted the 22-minute video in which the group used 
cutting-edge production and video editing techniques 
and powerful storytelling routines to parade the savage 
act. But throughout the video were ideological mes-
sages promoting ISIS’s cause, glorifying and justifying 
its brutality, and sending chilling threats to those who 
oppose it. Inadvertently maximizing the reach of ISIS’s 
intended message, news channels—including Al-
Jazeera and Fox News (2015)—incessantly played these 
images but focused primarily on the gruesomeness and 
brutality of the murderous act and on the group’s abil-
ity to produce high quality videos. However, the relent-
less coverage served ISIS’s goals by spreading its terror 
and carrying its intended threats. More importantly, 
the media attention reconfirmed ISIS’s grand “jihadist” 
narrative and bolstered its justifications. 
Seib and Janbek (2011) emphasized that “the mod-
ern communication model used by terrorist organiza-
tions is audience based, meaning centered, culture de-
pendent and always tied into an ongoing narrative 
stream that is part of the socio-political context in 
which these organizations operate” (p. 1). In fact, ISIS’s 
unrestrained cruelty has almost always carried justifi-
cations and subscribed to a grand “jihadist” narrative, 
and its violent messages are balanced with more posi-
tive content that shows life as normal and abundant in 
the newly established Caliphate (or Khilafah)—a state 
that transcends modern day borders and is ruled by a 
single political and religious leader according to Islamic 
law. Those baffled by ISIS’s recruitment abilities should 
realize that the group carefully contextualizes all its 
acts within widely accepted and legitimized grievances 
that millions of Arabs and Muslims share (Zafar, 2014), 
including decades of injustice in Palestine, the brutality 
of Arab authoritarian puppet regimes propped up by 
western powers, and the western colonial legacy that 
has left the region weak, impoverished, underdevel-
oped and divided, as well as a history of discrimination 
against minorities living in western countries.  
ISIS misses no opportunity to manipulate these 
grievances and sensationalize symbolic victories 
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against this western colonial legacy. Take for example 
the video that dramatized the removing of a small sec-
tion of the Iraqi-Syrian border, a symbolic act that sig-
naled the re-unification of Muslim lands. Dubbed “the 
breaking of the borders,” the ISIS-produced video cap-
tured dramatic moments of military vehicles crossing 
the borders and saluting teary-eyed local men waving 
the ISIS flag. Similar messages emphasized the dissolu-
tion of the Sykes-Picot borders—a reference to the se-
cret 1916 British-French agreement to divide the Le-
vant into spheres of influence, which led to the modern 
borders of Middle Eastern states. This act even reso-
nates with many anti-ISIS individuals in the region—
including seculars and non-Muslims. Such symbolic vic-
tories against deeply rooted historical grievances are 
further wrapped in a cloak of religious legitimacy, im-
buing them with an aura of divine righteousness and a 
sense of inevitable expansion and victory. During the 
same campaign, ISIS promised to “break the borders” 
of Jordan and Lebanon and to free Palestine. It de-
manded that all Muslims swear allegiance to its leader 
and help it establish the Caliphate. 
Beyond these grand symbolic acts, ISIS uses brand-
ing strategies to differentiate itself from the many oth-
er extremist Islamic groups and to maximize its political 
interests and instill its brand values into audiences 
around the world. Branding and marketing strategies 
are not only used by corporations and political parties, 
but also employed by terrorist groups—a matter vastly 
understudied (Gilboa, 2008). While it might sound ab-
surd that any group would aim to brand itself as a gang 
of ruthless, thuggish murderers, it is precisely these 
characteristics combined with the duality of the ISIS 
brand message that provide the group with immense 
resources to reach global audiences, recruit foreign cit-
izens, promote its ideology and achievements, inspire 
fear, and establish legitimacy.  
Although seemingly similar to other extremist 
groups, such as Al-Qaeda, ISIS has differentiated itself 
as a brand using several key strategies. It provided it-
self as a solution and an alternative—yet familiar and 
glorified—response to the aforementioned grievances 
that resonate with young Muslims around the world, 
particularly through the idea of a strong Caliphate, and 
it embodied consistent media messages through real-
world actions and achievements, and therefore created 
the illusion of authenticity and unity (Atwan, 2015). Its 
branding apparatus has worked both at the micro and 
macro levels: From minute details, such as the notori-
ous Guantanamo orange jumpsuits that many geo-
graphically disconnected ISIS subsidiaries force on their 
captives to create the illusion of a unified group and 
cohesive action, to the simultaneous waves of social 
media messages synchronized with waves of military 
actions on the ground that aim to dictate news frames 
and command the attention of global news agendas. As 
a result, ISIS has managed to rapidly beat its competi-
tion and recruit an unprecedented number of foreign 
fighters and supporters, arguably its most startling suc-
cess (Atwan, 2015; Franz, 2015; Neumann, 2015; Tro-
fimov, 2015; Vidino, 2014). 
In totality, ISIS’s brutal practices and terrorism 
strategies synchronized with elaborately produced 
media content, carefully managed social media cam-
paigns, and a consistent brand strategy have resulted 
in global media spectacles and omnipresent news cov-
erage of the group. This, in turn, has allowed it to 
achieve international notoriety within a few years of its 
debut on the international arena. Undoubtedly, ISIS 
today is the most infamous terrorist movement of our 
time and has “instituted transformative changes in 
strategy messaging, and recruitment” (Stern & Berger, 
2015, p. 7). Regardless of ISIS’s fate, these tactics will 
probably be utilized by emerging groups, which makes 
examining such a phenomenon worthwhile.  
But this study goes beyond the description of ISIS’s 
“innovative propaganda and unprecedented manipula-
tion of social media, and its recruitment of foreign 
fighters” (Stern & Berger, 2015, p. 7) and aims to offer 
an initial theoretical model that captures the intricacies 
of this phenomenon and helps delineate innovative 
public diplomacy strategies of non-state actors or vir-
tual states (Seib, 2011) by building on Entman’s (2008) 
cascading network activation model and Wolfsfeld’s 
(1997) political contest model and a host of modern 
branding strategies and digital and social media tactics. 
More specifically, it proposes a preliminary theoretical 
model of public diplomacy that takes into considera-
tion the characteristics of virtual states that are willing 
to use terrorism and are capable of mastering branding 
strategies, storytelling techniques, and social media 
methods to effectively achieve their public diplomacy 
goals, especially the recruitment of foreign publics. 
The study claims that ISIS’s synergistic use of terror-
ism, social media, effective storytelling, and branding 
achieves at least five public diplomacy aims: Gain 
mainstream media exposure and push advantageous 
news frames; create the illusion of a powerful unified 
group; project a favorable image to target global audi-
ences; recruit supporters in foreign states; and portray 
life under the Caliphate as a sustainable alternative 
lifestyle to the West and as a response to deeply root-
ed grievances. While this model simultaneously 
achieves psychological warfare aims, these are not the 
main focus of this study.  
Therefore, this article attempts to answer the ques-
tion: What are the characteristics of ISIS’s public di-
plomacy strategy that make it so successful in gaining 
media exposure, pushing advantageous news frames, 
reaching global publics and subsequently recruiting 
foreigners? The exploratory study uses a purposive 
sample of videos, Tweets, news releases and other so-
cial media activities that coincided with major ISIS-
instigated events, such as high profile executions and 
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major military achievements, including the “breaking of 
the borders” between Syria and Iraq. Most of the ana-
lyzed content is produced by Al-Hayat Media Center 
(2015), ISIS’s official media arm, but the analysis also 
includes nongraphic videos and content produced by 
other ISIS subsidiaries. While the analysis examined the 
content of these texts, the focus was also on their tim-
ing and synchronous release. The analysis also included 
the news media coverage of such events and examined 
original ideological documents produced by ISIS and 
other Islamist leaders.  
2. Mediated Public Diplomacy and Upward Cascading 
Frames of Terror 
Scholars have yet to agree on a unified definition for 
public diplomacy (Gilboa, 2008). Seib (2012) offered a 
simple initial definition: the “element of diplomacy that 
involves a government reaching out to a public, rather 
than to another government” (p. 64). Wang (2005) 
noted that public diplomacy aims “to communicate and 
cultivate on behalf of a nation-state a desired image 
and reputation, and to build common ground and un-
derstanding among nations and peoples” (p. 32). How-
ever, most scholars today concede that non-state ac-
tors also utilize public diplomacy for their own aims, 
which may or may not be for “common grounds or un-
derstanding” (Gilboa, 2008; Rasmussen, 2009; Seib, 
2012). Gilboa (2008) offered an extensive critique of 
the conflicting, contradictory and confusing definitions 
of public diplomacy in the literature and attempted to 
differentiate between public diplomacy and other 
forms (such as media diplomacy) by focusing on the act 
of using “the media and other channels of communica-
tion to influence public opinion in foreign societies” (p. 
58). Gilboa also expanded the list of public diplomacy 
tools to include “media framing, information manage-
ment, PR, nation branding,” among others (p. 58). Con-
sistently but more parsimoniously, Entman (2008) dif-
ferentiated his theoretical construction of mediated 
public diplomacy from other public diplomacy theories 
by focusing on specifically targeted and short-term 
aims that utilize mass media and the internet “to in-
crease support of a country’s specific foreign policies 
among audiences beyond that country’s borders” (p. 
88). Entman defined mediated public diplomacy “as 
the organized attempts by a president and his foreign 
policy apparatus to exert as much control as possible 
over the framing of U.S. policy in foreign media.” This 
transparently U.S.-centric definition also assumes a de-
veloped democratic state that offers some press free-
doms and internal contests over news frames. In this 
context, Entman extends his cascading network activa-
tion model—which explains the manner in which U.S. 
foreign policy frames are contested and/or accepted in 
U.S. news coverage—to a mediated public diplomacy 
model. In the latter model, the likelihood of U.S. 
frames attaining parity or at least a realistic chance to 
compete with news frames in foreign countries de-
pends on the degree of cultural congruence between 
the U.S. and the target country, which makes the mod-
el applicable to other states.  
But what if the framing originates from a virtual 
state? Seib (2011) notes that “virtual states are increas-
ingly significant factors for foreign policy strategists 
who address issues ranging from public diplomacy to 
counterterrorism” (p. 17). He defines three levels of 
virtual states: recognized virtual states or the extension 
of a state through its globally dispersed diaspora; de 
facto nations or quasi-states that have yet to gain legal 
recognition, such as Palestine and Kurdistan; and finally 
“non-state actors such as terrorist organizations that 
use media-reliant networks to establish themselves as 
quasi-states” (p. 18). Viewing extremist non-state ac-
tors as virtual states helps us better to understand 
these resilient organizations’ military, political, finan-
cial, and communication efforts (Seib, 2011). This ap-
proach also repositions these groups as more capable 
actors with the potential to achieve their goals. It cir-
cumvents the stereotypical depiction of these extrem-
ists as backward psychopaths living in caves and com-
manding rag-tag gangs of incompetent fanatics, when 
in reality many of them have achieved military, political 
and economic feats that surpass the accomplishments 
of many existing states (Atwan, 2015). More im-
portantly, viewing a group like ISIS as a virtual state al-
lows for a more rational and objective assessment of 
its mediated public diplomacy strategy, especially in 
regards to its goals to reach and recruit foreign citizens 
through intentional news framing efforts that position 
it as a credible remedy for real grievances that reso-
nate with thousands of potential recruits dispersed 
around the globe.  
However, how can we place these virtual states 
within Entman’s mediated public diplomacy model, es-
pecially when their cultures are diametrically incongru-
ent with most state cultures around the world, let 
alone western democracies? According to Entman’s 
degree of cultural congruence conception, ISIS’s initi-
ated news frames will have no chance of competing in 
this uphill battle with cultures that fundamentally con-
trast with the essence of such virtual states. But what if 
the intended news frames are so vivid, dramatic and 
powerful (Moeller, 2000) that many news institutions 
have no choice but to include them, at least partially?  
Terrorism spectacles can often create such power-
ful news frames. Scholars have noted the centrality of 
publicity as the defining characteristic of terrorism (Na-
cos, 2002) and have metaphorically described media as 
“terrorism’s oxygen” (Seib & Janbek, 2011). What’s 
more, those who use terrorism as a propaganda tactic 
are well aware of the media’s ability to instill fear and 
anger among a widely distributed audience (Seib & 
Janbek, 2011). Non-state actors typically cut off from 
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access to dominant mass media and desperate for pub-
licity and the recognition of their cause often use ter-
rorism to force themselves onto the news agenda and 
gain such publicity (Nacos, 2002). Given this symbiotic 
relationship between terrorism and media (Wilkinson, 
1997), news coverage of terrorist attacks creates a di-
lemma for journalists (Viera, 1991). When news institu-
tions cover terrorist attacks, they are simultaneously 
serving the terrorist attackers by offering them publici-
ty, recognition and legitimacy. And news institutions, 
particularly in a democratic state, can rarely resist cov-
ering terrorism, especially when these attacks target 
their own compatriots or the interests of their nations. 
Even if they manage to ignore covering such highly 
newsworthy events, this often forces the terrorist 
group to escalate its attacks even further to a point 
where it’s impossible to ignore (Seib & Janbek, 2011).  
In this sense, terrorism turns Entman’s model on its 
head by pushing news frames up the cascading net-
work, and the matter becomes more complicated in a 
media ecology where anyone can produce and dissem-
inate information at a global scale (Hoskins, Awan, &, 
O'Loughlin, 2012).  
3. Political Contest over News Frames and the Duality 
of the Terror Message in a Networked Arena 
Terrorism may ensure temporary media exposure, but 
it does not necessarily guarantee the perpetrator will 
win continuous media access, reach the intended audi-
ences, or receive the intended framing, especially for a 
fledgling virtual state. In his attempt to understand the 
influence of two unequal sides competing for media 
exposure, Wolfsfeld (1997) advanced a political contest 
model to explain how media coverage is shaped and in 
turn shapes the struggle for control over outcomes. He 
differentiated between the “struggle over access” and 
the “struggle over meaning.”  
When it comes to struggle of over access, Wolfsfeld 
(1997) noted that political power could be translated 
into power over the media by increasing a player’s 
“value to the media” and decreasing its “dependence 
on the media.” The value to the media construct is 
measured by four variables: political/social status, or-
ganization/resources, exceptional behavior, and control 
over political environment—four matters that ISIS has 
succeeded in elevating, as discussed below. Dependence 
on the media is measured through political access and 
need for external support—both matters that seem less 
important in the current era of social media networks 
and easy access to communication and production tech-
nologies, as delineated in the next section.  
On the other hand, shaping the context of the mes-
sage or the “struggle over meaning” relates to the abil-
ity of political antagonists to better understand the 
media’s construction of news frames in order to influ-
ence such framing (Wolfsfeld, 1997). Although 
Wolfsfeld gave the strong political player an advantage 
over the weak challenger in promoting its own news 
frames, he attributed part of the latter group’s success 
to its ability to construct an effective message that re-
verberates with existing news frames. In the post-9/11 
era, ISIS has surprisingly been able to capitalize on—
rather than be damaged by—the “war on terrorism” 
frames that dominate much of global news coverage of 
the Middle East. Wolfsfeld noted that although it is the 
political player that tries to promote advantageous news 
frames, the media play an important role in adopting 
these news frames. Consistently with Entman (2008), 
Wolfsfeld (1997) explains, “The construction of media 
frames of conflict is an interactive process in which the 
press attempts to find a narrative fit between incoming 
information and existing media frames.” 
Applying this model to ISIS, it is obvious that the 
group was able to quickly build political and social sta-
tus by winning military battles and, as mentioned earli-
er, playing on the grievances of many Arabs and Mus-
lims (Atwan, 2015). It was also able to bolster its 
organizational and communication mechanisms and 
build immense military and financial resources while 
simultaneously gaining control over its political envi-
ronment by occupying large swaths of land and con-
trolling lucrative natural resources in Syria and Iraq 
(Atwan, 2015; Stern & Berger, 2015). ISIS has shown 
dexterity for propaganda as a means of building credi-
bility and establishing legitimacy, using social media 
and cyber technology for both recruitment and intimi-
dation purposes (Farwell, 2014). Moreover, ISIS’s en-
gagement in exceptional behavior has been unsur-
passed recently. Its brutal tactics, including spectacular 
terrorism, mass killings, public beheadings of soldiers, 
journalists, and aid workers, and the abduction, rape 
and selling of women of religious and ethnic minorities 
are only matched by their willingness to showcase such 
criminal acts through online videos and social media. 
ISIS’s extreme brutality has even appalled Al-Qaeda’s 
leadership (Mohammed, 2014).  
The above has helped ISIS win the struggle over ac-
cess, but what about the struggle over meaning? For a 
weaker contender to be in a position to impose even a 
few news frames, it must be able to initiate the frames 
and push them up the cascading network, an onerous 
challenge for a group that does not have any control 
over dominant mass media. However, online social 
networks and advances in digital media production 
tools have offered such weaker groups immense op-
portunities to craft sophisticated messages and dissem-
inate them (Seib & Janbek, 2011).  
In the past, extremist groups that used terrorism to 
achieve media coverage relied almost completely on 
mass media gatekeepers to initiate the dissemination 
of news about their attacks. Today, these groups have 
the ability to craft, initiate and widely disseminate their 
information through social media without facing cen-
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sorship from mass media. “Most mainstream news or-
ganizations impose standards that rule out graphic im-
ages from terror attacks, but the perpetrators of such 
attacks might disseminate those images throughout 
the Internet… to audiences that are smaller but are 
considered high-value such as potential recruits” (Seib & 
Janbek, 2011, p. 11). Although most mainstream media 
censor and filter content produced by ISIS, even the 
slightest coverage of ISIS terrorism offers it immense ad-
vantage over other competing extremist groups in this 
networked media arena. Even negative mass media cov-
erage offers ISIS credibility and name-recognition and 
tips select audiences to seek independent and unfil-
tered information about it—the first step toward build-
ing a relationship with the group, buying into its brand, 
and falling victim to its recruitment.  
What’s more, online social networks are highly 
compatible with terrorist groups’ decentralized loose 
network and horizontal rather than hierarchal structur-
ing, especially for recruitment and radicalization pur-
poses (Seib & Janbek, 2011, p. 20). In this way, ISIS’s 
decentralization has proven to be an asset for its prop-
aganda efforts too. Since thousands of individuals are 
peddling ISIS’s propaganda, it is much harder to coun-
ter (Melchior, 2014). Still, for ISIS to be able to push its 
news frames and content online, it also needs to cir-
cumvent the social media filters.  
For more than a decade, many extremist groups 
have engaged in a cyber war in which they’ve struggled 
to keep their online content and social media accounts 
afloat. Each time social media companies find a way to 
track and eliminate terrorists’ content and accounts, 
the terrorist groups’ tactics evolve. Stern and Berger 
(2015) chronicled the progression of terrorist organiza-
tions’ early use of individual and official social media 
accounts, to the use of bots and mobile phone apps 
that automate the spread of messages, and the most 
recent leveraging of crowdsourcing strategies. At first, 
social media services were able to easily dismantle the 
official accounts that promoted terrorism by banning 
them. Despite the ability of many organizations to rec-
reate other accounts, it took considerable time for 
them to rebuild credibility. In some cases, such as al-
Shabab—the terrorist organization that attacked 
Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, in September 2013, 
Twitter kept eliminating their accounts until al-Shabab 
eventually gave up (Farwell, 2014; Stern & Berger, 
2015, p. 144). However, ISIS innovated a reliable strate-
gy. Instead of relying on centralized accounts that could 
be easily identified and “wacked,” ISIS opted for decen-
tralized crowdsourcing, in-house designed apps and 
bots, and hashtag hacking. In a memo sent to support-
ers, ISIS described its Twitter crowdsourcing strategy as 
based on a system of four tiers of supporters: head sup-
porters, diligent supporters, general supporters, and si-
lent supporters (Al-Hamad, n.d.). Each tweeting cam-
paign follows a consistent and predicable pattern:  
“After being posted and authenticated by official 
ISIS members, a second-tier group of several dozen 
online activists would retweet the link with a 
hashtag, then retweet each other’s tweets and 
write new tweets, all using the same hashtag. Other 
activists would upload the release to multiple plat-
forms, so that it could be found even when Internet 
providers pulled the content down. [A] third ti-
er…would repeat the process on a larger scale.” 
(Stern & Berger, 2015, p. 155) 
The strategy creates what is called a Twitter storm, 
where hundreds of tweets with consistent hashtags at 
coordinated times “cross the threshold that would 
trigger trending alerts,” thereby exposing such tweet to 
a wider audience and generating more activity (p. 155).  
These Twitter storms are coordinated with spectac-
ular terrorist acts that ensure at least brief mass media 
attention, but more importantly create a synergy with 
the online communication campaign. The overall out-
come is not only optimal reach and exposure guaran-
teed by the terrorism spectacles, but also consistent 
frames reaching various ISIS stakeholders.  
With regards to these intended news frames, it is 
important to recognize that ISIS’s global media opera-
tion has two key narratives: one for recruitment pur-
poses and to keep the support of its domestic audi-
ence, and one for an audience it considers its enemy, 
although in most cases the same message achieves 
both aims. For the latter group, ISIS uses terrorism as a 
psychological warfare tactic. It wants to frighten its 
foes, deter counterattacks, demoralize enemy fighters, 
and coerce conversions (Melchior, 2014), an outcome 
that spectacularly worked during ISIS’s invasion of sev-
eral major Iraqi cities in June 2015 (Beck, 2015). But for 
its domestic/recruitment audience, ISIS uses terrorism 
to initiate and push propaganda that in turn reaches 
recruits and supporters. This is not to say that the mes-
sages that target recruits are devoid of blood and vio-
lence or that somehow the supporters ignore the vio-
lent imagery. On the contrary, much of it contains 
horrific bloody content, and shows beheadings and 
mass killings (Trianni & Katz, 2014). However, their vio-
lent videos—even the most gruesome executions—
offer careful and often lengthy justifications for such 
acts. For example, the notorious 22-minute video that 
showcased the execution of a captured Jordanian pilot 
contained over 15 minutes of content that justified the 
climactic act of burning him alive, including several 
minutes showing the captured pilot walking through 
the rubble of an area he supposedly assaulted, inter-
spersed—through parallel editing techniques—with 
shots of killed civilians being pulled out from under the 
leveled buildings. 
Therefore, from a communication perspective, 
ISIS’s propagation of terror—its psychological war-
fare—and the recruitment of supporters to its vision of 
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building a new society go hand-in-hand, and both sides 
of this image are often simultaneously propagated 
(Stern & Berger, 2015, p. 113). What’s more, ISIS is in-
tentional in its effort to display its own atrocities and 
violence “to awaken potential recruits to the reality of 
the jihadis’ war and to intimidate enemies by showing 
the price they would pay for their involvement” (p. 
115). In the Management of Savagery, a blueprint for 
jihadists to establish the Caliphate, the pseudonymous 
author Abu Bakr Naji (2004) advocated the escalation 
of violence in order to attract supporters and effect po-
larization between enemies and advocates (p. 46). The 
second section of the document, entitled Path to Em-
powerment, explicitly explained how to “attract new 
youth through…conducting operations that attract 
people’s attention” (p. 17). Stern and Berger (2015) 
noted that the vast distribution of such “violence porn” 
over the internet has led to: 
“the birth of a media model that has been trans-
formed, expanded, and refined to a science….ISIS 
has made its name on the marketing of savagery, 
evolving its message to sell a strange but potent 
new blend of utopianism and appalling carnage to a 
worldwide audience…. ISIS is using beheadings as a 
form of marketing, manipulation, and recruitment, 
determined to bring the public display of savagery 
into our lives, trying to instill in us a state of terror.” 
(p. 3) 
This “media model” seems to be working efficiently, as 
the number of western recruits by an extremist Islamic 
group has been the highest ever recorded in modern 
history, while the notoriety of ISIS has reached epic 
proportions on a global scale. The estimated number of 
global recruits who had joined the fight in Syria and 
Iraq by early 2015 has exceeded the estimated 20,000 
foreigners recruited in the 1980s to fight in the Afghan-
istan war (Hagopian, 2015; Neumann, 2015). Some re-
ports have indicated that up to 30,000 foreign fighters 
from 100 countries have joined ISIS in Syria/Iraq since 
2011 (Schmitt & Sengupta, 2015). Especially disturbing 
is that many recruited women and men are relative 
newcomers to Islamic observance (Trofimov, 2015) and 
about a quarter are recent converts to Islam (Barrett, 
2014). This indicates that the group is gaining appeal 
well beyond its fundamentalist roots. And the more 
foreigners it recruits, the broader its recruitment appa-
ratus becomes. The International Centre for the Study 
of Radicalization and Political Violence found that a 
surprisingly high number of western citizens fighting 
with ISIS are using social media to recruit even more 
westerners (Carter, Maher, & Neumann, 2014).  
The dual narrative strategy of ISIS means that the 
struggle over meaning is achieved for both opponents 
and supporters simultaneously. ISIS’s messages can be 
described as following a winner’s narrative that “de-
pends on the group projecting an image of strength 
and momentum” (Gartenstein-Ross, 2015, p. 3; Stern & 
Berger, 2015). While most audiences who receive the 
ISIS news frames via the mass media will be horrified, a 
select curious minority will pursue further information 
about the group online. For the opposing audience, ISIS 
inspires fear, demonstrates strength, and sustains a 
credible threat. For the curious minority, ISIS activates 
interest and potential fascination, while social media 
reframing provides the opportunity to initiate and build 
a relationship in the hopes of ultimate recruitment.  
But in addition to scaring foes, justifying brutal vio-
lence, and reaching recruits, ISIS also wants to make 
“jihad” seem like a sustainable lifestyle. ISIS fighters 
not only publish grim pictures of themselves with guns 
and tanks, but also of everyday life—fighters playing 
football, swimming and enjoying feasts (The Straits 
Times, 2014). They want to “show that they are the 
sexiest jihadi group on the block” (Trianni & Katz, 
2014). Through effective branding, ISIS has produced 
high quality promotional material that brands its ef-
forts as manly, cool and rebellious (Breslow, 2014; 
Melchior, 2014).  
4. The Rebellious ISIS Brand: A Response to a Global 
Existential Crisis 
There is little doubt that ISIS possesses a deft com-
mand of social media and is more skilled at using it for 
recruitment than any other group (Atwan, 2015), but 
ISIS is not the first group of Islamic extremists to use 
social media to propagate its messages. However, no 
group thus far has succeeded in marketing itself the 
way ISIS has, and none have made social media such a 
central (and public) part of their recruitment efforts 
(Stern & Berger, 2015). While in the past extremist 
groups operated in secretive online forums, ISIS has 
spread its message—in many languages—through tens 
of thousands of publicly accessible Twitter and Face-
book accounts (Melchior, 2014). Using professionally 
produced videos and propaganda, ISIS reaches young, 
alienated and disenfranchised Muslims with a cause 
that they perceive is worthwhile (Trianni & Katz, 2014). 
Its’ media content competes with high quality TV pro-
grams and news material produced in the West. ISIS so 
far has demonstrated that it deeply understands 
branding and marketing, has first class media produc-
ers, and is adept at using the latest technology (Mel-
chior, 2014). 
However, no amount of activity on social media 
would ordinarily make someone leave everything be-
hind and take such radical positions without a compel-
ling narrative. ISIS’s strength also comes from its suc-
cess in branding itself and differentiating its story. 
Branding entails imbuing products with an emo-
tional dimension with which people can identify (Gil-
boa, 2008, p. 67). The contemporary concept of a 
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product brand, or a consumer’s mental image of a 
product, has widely been implemented for “state 
brands,” with the aim of creating emotional resonance 
for global publics with the image of a place (Van Ham, 
2001). What’s more, state-branding strategies could 
easily be utilized by non-states, including extremist 
groups (Gilboa, 2008; Wang, 2005). It may seem coun-
terintuitive to think of ISIS as a brand, as most brands 
we think of have positive associative networks, but 
what is a modern brand if not a community of “people 
driven by a common belief system”? People adhere to 
such brands and attract others who share common be-
liefs (Hanlon, 2015). Deconstructing the ISIS social code 
that fuels its brand community helps explain how, even 
as it creates terror, ISIS also captures imaginations of 
its target audiences. Perceiving ISIS as a brand reveals 
that it has all the makings of a successful one: it re-
sponds to an ideal, provides a fascinating rebellious 
and adventurous story, offers a distinct position, and is 
grounded in real action and proven success. 
The most successful brands target powerful ideo-
logical contradictions produced by society. People tend 
to value brands primarily for their cultural and identity-
building values: “Through popular culture, society 
paints a picture of its ideals….People strive for these 
ideals and experience tensions when how they under-
stand themselves differs from the standards society 
has set” (Lagace, 2002). Such contradictions create a 
deep need for new identities and world views that help 
reconcile these tensions.  
Imagine the tensions millions of observant Muslims 
face on a daily basis, especially those with a conserva-
tive religious upbringing living in western societies in a 
post-9/11 world of rampant discrimination and preju-
dice against Muslims. From dress codes and customs, 
to food and worship traditions, to proper relationships 
and beyond, many struggle to reconcile their ideals 
with the existing social realities and standards. But re-
gardless of religion, globally many disenfranchised 
youth today struggle with modernity’s moral, economic 
and social tensions. Giddens (1991) referred to this 
phenomenon as “personal meaninglessness” or a sense 
that “life has nothing worthwhile to offer,” a funda-
mental symptom of modernity explained as the “re-
pression of moral questions which day-to-day life pos-
es, but which are denied answers” (p. 9). Emancipatory 
politics often emerge as responses to such existential 
crises, and this provides opportunities for new social 
movements to capitalize on such tensions and provide 
radical and rebellious alternative world views.  
But can we pinpoint the characteristics of such po-
tential recruits? Decades of research on the psycholog-
ical characteristics and social-economic statuses of 
those who become terrorists have reached no simple 
answers and have certainly not offered singular identi-
fying characteristics. According to Stern and Berger 
(2015), what is required is a combination of internal 
needs—including perceived benefits of becoming an ex-
tremist group member or potential psychological and 
material benefits—and external factors, which deal with 
perceptions of momentous world events, especially in-
justices. In other words, a “mix of political sentiment, re-
ligious belief, and personal circumstances is required” 
(p. 83). The power vacuum that was brought about by 
the second Iraq war and the Syrian civil war has provid-
ed much of the external factors, especially within the 
greater global “jihadist” narrative, which ISIS has deftly 
manipulated (Atwan, 2015). But while the internal reli-
gious motivations may have provided the necessary at-
traction to ISIS’s cause, these were not sufficient for a 
person to uproot himself and risk his life to fight for that 
group. Other internal and external factors would have 
played an important role, factors such as acceptance 
and reinforcement from specific recruiters or a person’s 
social network and longstanding grievances and a 
sense of alienation (Stern & Berger, 2015, p. 82). This 
study does not argue that online videos and social me-
dia have magically somehow persuaded some people 
to join ISIS, but instead it emphasizes that the capabili-
ties that social media offer—especially the two-way one-
on-one interpersonal communication capacity—have 
played a major role in such recruitments. For example, 
according to Stern and Berger (2015), the growing num-
ber of foreign fighters on social media has helped with 
the recruitment effort by providing commentary on the 
conflict and detailed logistical information for potential 
recruits on how to travel to Syria/Iraq.  
It becomes less surprising, therefore, to fathom 
why some young Muslim westerners, especially wom-
en, have been lured by the ultra-conservative ISIS 
brand—albeit a rebellious brand that responds to their 
many grievances and reconciles the moral contradic-
tions between their ideals and their current circum-
stances. Attempting to explain how three young British 
teenagers left their comfortable middle-class lives in 
the UK to join ISIS, Bennhold (2015) notes that the 
young recruits came “from a world in which teenage 
rebellion is expressed through a radical religiosity that 
questions everything around them. In this world, the 
counterculture is conservative. Islam is punk rock. The 
headscarf is liberating. Beards are sexy.” Indeed, the 
ISIS brand has cleverly responded to their “vulnerabili-
ties, frustrations and dreams, and fill[ed] a void the 
West has so far failed to address” (Bennhold, 2015) by 
capitalizing on what Gartenstein-Ross (2015) referred 
to as the narrative of the broader “jihadist movement.” 
Although Gartenstein-Ross noted that conflating this 
broader narrative with ISIS’s appeal causes observers 
to overlook important vulnerabilities in ISIS’s propa-
ganda strategy, we would argue that ISIS’s keen efforts 
to conflate its propaganda with that of the broader “ji-
hadist movement” itself makes its narrative attractive 
and persuasive by offering it legitimacy among a broad 
target audience, even beyond Muslims. Indeed, its nar-
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rative serves as the basis of a counterculture for alien-
ated and disenchanted youth of various backgrounds, 
as evidenced by the converts joining the ranks. What’s 
more, although ISIS’s extremist, selective and distorted 
interpretation of Islam offers the ideological basis of its 
claims, Islam itself is not the main appeal and drive for 
such recruits, especially considering most of those who 
join ISIS are not very knowledgeable about Islam (Bar-
rett & Myers, 2014). “[T]he religion really is a gloss 
over a much deeper desire for a sense of identity and 
purpose and belonging, and they want to participate in 
something….They want some sort of definite direction 
to take, which can lead, at the same time, to a very 
personal internal sense of fulfillment” (p. 3). 
At the core of ISIS’s brand ideal is the Caliphate, a 
response to the incoherence and tensions many re-
cruits face in their lives in western societies, a response 
that offers closure, coherence and a resolution to a 
deep existential crisis. In the absence of the alterna-
tives, fundamentalist ideologies offered a quintessen-
tial fit to satisfy just such cravings: “They want to re-
make the world, and find only jihadism as an 
alternative ideology because there is nothing else left 
out there…it is the most obvious counterpoint to the 
west” (Trofimov, 2015). Beyond closure and coherence, 
ISIS’s ideology also offers a form of significance. By 
joining the fight, recruits believe they can earn a larger-
than-life status as heroes and martyrs and win a place 
in history. Finally, the Caliphate is meant to represent a 
world where, in theory, Muslims are re-empowered—
politically and economically—and where they will no 
longer be wronged. They are given back their agency, 
their power, and their glory. “Like the Communists, 
[ISIS] promises universal welfare, free medicine and so-
cial justice….A lot of young people have the same idea 
that the capitalism-centric western system is not for 
them, and that another society is being set up” (Tro-
fimov, 2015). Furthermore, the Caliphate is an alterna-
tive world where the Muslim is desired and successful, 
rather than being alienated and considered a nuisance, 
a message perpetuated by many rightwing western poli-
ticians and the practices of western states in dealing 
with Muslims, such as the Abu Ghraib scandal, which re-
confirmed the notion that the West is hostile not only to 
Al-Qaeda but to Muslims in general (Spens, 2014). 
The ISIS brand strategy is consistent with Sachs’s 
(2012) theory that successful brands have to actually 
live their story and take action rather than just tell it. 
However, for that story to stand out in a world of me-
dia fatigue and cynicism, it has to also be distinct 
(Moon, 2010). ISIS offers both real action and a distinct 
story. For decades, al-Qaeda talked about re-
establishing the Caliphate, but it never took action to-
wards that goal, focusing instead on attacking the 
West. ISIS, on the other hand, did: “By capturing ex-
pansive territory and heavy weaponry, and flush with 
wealth…, ISIS claims to have taken a major first step 
toward righting what it sees as this ancient wrong, cre-
ating a unified Muslim state that will subsume existing 
nations” (Shane & Hubbard, 2014). This differentiates it 
from any other extremist Islamic group, and more re-
cruits are lured by its success in creating an Islamic 
state (Yan, 2015). “Young people look at ISIS and say, 
‘By gosh, they’re doing it!’,” and ISIS continues to por-
trays itself as “restoring idealized eras of earlier Islamic 
history,” an idea that resonates with some Muslims 
around the globe (Shane & Hubbard, 2014). 
Beyond that, the ISIS brand offers the promise of 
extreme adventure and conquest. ISIS has mastered 
the art of empowering its adherents and making them 
the heroes of the story, acting as mentor and guide to 
them, a crucial step in building a successful following 
(Sachs, 2012). It seems that the exciting desire to par-
ticipate in a battle prophesied a century and a half ago 
is a strong motivator to join ISIS’s ranks (Barrett, 2014). 
Some foreign fighters are youth who are mainly looking 
for adventure, purpose, and outlets for their violence, 
and ISIS provides them with just that (Trofimov, 2015). 
“The group attracts followers yearning for not only re-
ligious righteousness but also adventure….And, of 
course, some people just want to kill—and ISIS wel-
comes them, too….ISIS operates in urban settings and 
offers recruits immediate opportunities to fight” (Cro-
nin, 2015). But it does not stop there. ISIS also offers 
the opportunity for sexual conquest, yet another dis-
tinguishing aspect of its brand. In al-Qaeda, there is no 
place for sex. Subsequently, al-Qaeda’s brand is unap-
pealing for young western recruits seeking sexual 
thrills. For the al-Qaeda recruit, sex comes after mar-
riage (Cronin, 2015). ISIS’s sales pitch encourages all 
forms of conquest, including sexual slavery and rape, 
and even justifies such horrendous acts as religious du-
ty (Callimachi, 2015). 
Stengel (2011) found that the ideals that drive the 
most successful brands could be grouped into at least 
one of five fields he calls “fundamental human values” 
that improve people’s lives. These fields are: eliciting 
joy, enabling connection, evoking pride, inspiring ex-
ploration, and impacting society. Analyzing a sample of 
videos produced by Al-Hayat Media Center (2015) 
demonstrates how the ISIS brand messages contain all 
five of these fields. Images that activate experiences of 
happiness are abundant, from scenes of children run-
ning around, laughing and eating cotton candy and ice 
cream, to adult men in public goofing around and en-
joying the outdoors. The videos use common plain folk 
characters and settings that aim to enable connection, 
such as local business owners and shoppers in bustling 
marketplaces. Also common are messages that instill a 
sense of pride and confidence, including images of 
markets flowing with abundant produce, businesses 
operating as usual, running electricity and water, and 
people going about their daily lives in peace and tran-
quility. Other messages insinuate support and harmo-
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ny, as demonstrated by united shouts that the Cali-
phate is here to stay. Several shots that emphasize 
normalcy and exclude any images of death and de-
struction—accompanied by sound bites confirming 
that barely any planes are flying above their heads—
reconfirm that the Caliphate is not a war zone but a 
normal livable place. Even western cultural references 
play a part in the group’s brand messages. Take for ex-
ample some popular hashtags, such as #JihadiFitness 
and #LittleMujahid (McCoy, 2014). ISIS has even posted 
pictures of its fighters playing with kittens and eating 
Nutella. These images communicate the message that, 
despite it being Islamic, ISIS promotes its people’s wel-
fare (Farwell, 2014). This brand image is important in 
ISIS’s recruiting strategy, especially in relation to its po-
tential foreign audiences and supporters who may 
never actually come into physical contact with fighters 
or the Caliphate (Gartenstein-Ross, 2015). They will in-
stead judge the group through “the image it has culti-
vated through social media and online strategic mes-
saging, and on the mainstream media’s reporting” 
about its victories and overall standing (Gartenstein-
Ross, 2015).  
Despite containing diverse content, the analyzed 
videos produced by Al-Hayat Media Center had the 
same ultimate objective: to portray the Caliphate as a 
functioning, better, and viable alternative to the West. 
Through that message, ISIS seeks to illustrate “jihad” as 
a sustainable lifestyle. Indeed, in most videos, life in 
the Caliphate seems to be completely normal, abun-
dant, prosperous and secure, an image that could be 
pursued as the public diplomacy goal of any country.  
5. Conclusion 
This study examined the mediated public diplomacy 
strategies of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). It 
highlighted the group’s ability to implement sophisti-
cated public diplomacy methods through a combina-
tion of terrorism tactics synchronized with communica-
tion strategies to gain media access and exposure, 
push news frames that serve its interests, and continu-
ally produce and disseminate a consistent brand and 
target defined stakeholders with a dual message using 
advanced branding strategies that resonate with cul-
tural values and help it ultimately recruit supporters 
and deter opponents. By viewing ISIS as a virtual state 
(Seib, 2011) and building on the theoretical models of 
Entman (2008) and Wolfsfeld (1997) to understand 
how the group is able to gain media exposure and push 
news frames up the cascading network through the 
synchronized use of terrorism and a sophisticated 
branding and social media marketing strategy built on 
a dual message that simultaneously deters perceived 
opponents and attracts potential supporters, one can 
better examine and understand its powerful and suc-
cessful mediated public diplomacy strategy. While this 
study was an initial step towards advancing a theoreti-
cal model for mediated public diplomacy of virtual 
states, future research will require deeper empirical 
examination and a more complex methodological de-
sign in order to build an elaborate theoretical model to 
address this matter.  
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